AUS Repository

Recent Submissions

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    Optimizing the Performance of a Microwave Tomography System for Biomedical Applications
    (2025-04) Abuowda, Zainab; Zakaria, Amer; Qaddoumi, Nasser
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    Optimizing Resource allocation for Post-Disaster Recovery in Resilient Distribution Networks
    (2025-04) AlMansoori, Saif Rashid; Osman, Ahmed; Shaaban, Mostafa
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    Pipeline Inspection using Microwave Nondestructive Testing
    (2025-01) Ghattas, Ahmad; Qaddoumi, Nasser; Zakaria, Amer
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    Formal Verification of a Security Protocol in Vehicular Communication
    (2025-04) Almaazmi, Mohamed Adel; Dghaym, Dana
    Vehicular communication systems enable vehicles to exchange critical information with other traffic participants, infrastructure, and networks, offering significant benefits for road safety and transportation efficiency. However, designing secure Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) protocols presents unique challenges as they must simultaneously ensure message authenticity, protect user privacy, prevent attacks, and maintain low computational overhead for time-sensitive applications. Formal verification of these protocols is essential but traditionally complex, as it requires reasoning about both cryptographic mechanisms and system-level properties. This thesis presents a novel complementary verification approach that combines two formal verification tools, Tamarin Prover for cryptographic analysis with Event-B for system refinement to comprehensively verify V2X security protocols. Using the Anonymous and Efficient (AEE) protocol as a case study, we develop a systematic methodology for translating between formal models, leveraging Tamarin's strength in adversarial reasoning and Event-B's structured refinement capabilities. Our refinement-based approach moves from abstract communication to concrete protocol mechanisms, with Tamarin serving as a cryptographic extension of the most concrete Event-B level. Through this methodology, we verify the AEE protocol's anonymity, traceability, event linkability, and unlinkability properties, while identifying critical requirements not explicit in the original protocol specification, including token-event binding constraints and authority separation mechanisms. The dual-method verification reveals structural insights that would be difficult to obtain using either method alone, providing implementation guidance for secure V2X deployments and establishing a generalized approach for verifying security protocols with complex system interactions. Our results demonstrate that complementary formal methods can provide stronger verification assurance than single-method approaches for safety-critical V2X security protocols.

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